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The Justice Department's Recent
Antitrust Enforcement Policy: Toward
a "Positive Comity" Solution to
International Competition Problems?
ABSTRACT

Obstacles to free competition are abundant in the
International economy. Before 1992, the United States
Department of Justice only attacked such obstacles if they
Impeded the Import commerce of the United States. But as
more and more businesses enter the International markets,
the ability of U.S. businesses to compete in foreign markets
free of export cartels and other obstacles to free competition
is of greater concern. In 1992, the U.S. Justice Department
addressed this concern by reversing prior policy and
announcing that the U.S. government would also attack
obstacles that impede the ability of U.S. businesses to export
their products to foreign markets. This Note analyzes the
complaints that have been filed by the Justice Department
since the 1992 policy change, focusing on the jurisdictional
issues that have yet to be contested and the international
Implications of such a change in policy. It thenfocuses on the
legislationpassed In 1994 to assistthe Justice Department in
International antitrust enforcement efforts, the International
Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994. This new
legislation emphasizes cooperation and mutual assistance
between the Justice Department and foreign antitrust
enforcement bodies as the means to free the international
economy from anticompetitive obstacles to free competition.
The author concludes that, if confidentiality concerns of U.S.
businesses are adequately safeguarded, the new legislation
emphasizing bilateral mutual assistance in antitrust
enforcement efforts offers more promise than the 1992 policy
change In combating obstacles to free competition in foreign
markets.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In many ways, the problems that confront the world economy

today confronted the U.S. economy at the end of the nineteenth
century. Businesses with rapidly growing power were forming
trusts or other anticompetitive business practices. When
investigators tried to break up such businesses, they were met
with corporate resistance, especially while gathering evidence.
Even if a state judgment was obtained to break up the trusts,
state borders limited a state court's remedial powers. The United
States Congress enacted the Sherman Act' in 1890 to remedy

1.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
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such discovery and jurisdictional obstacles to a competitive U.S.
economy.
Faced with growing obstacles to competition in the
international economy and a desire to reduce the trade deficit, the
United'States Justice Department (the Department) has recently
decided to attack foreign export cartels directly through U.S.
antitrust law by rescinding footnote 159 of the 1988 Antitrust
Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations (1988
A U.S. solution to an
International Antitrust Guidelines). 2
international antitrust problem, however, can only accomplish so
much in freeing the international economy from anticompetitive
restraints on trade.
This is not to say that the recent international antitrust

enforcement policy of the United States has been a failure. From
a U.S. vantage point, it certainly has not. But the political and
diplomatic stakes continue to rise as more and more countries
enact blocking statutes and diplomatically protest the
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law.
This Note explores the jurisdictional, diplomatic, and comity
concerns that have arisen with the aggressive enforcement stance
recently taken by the Department. It then compares the new
legislation passed by Congress in 1994, and concludes that
bilateral mutual assistance offers a better solution to the
competitive obstacles that confront U.S. businesses.
Part II of this Note examines the legal and practical obstacles
that the Department must consider when seeking to regulate
foreign anticompetitive conduct. Part III then analyzes the first
two "footnote 159" cases, which raise a host of jurisdictional and
comity questions. These questions are then discussed in the
context of the proposed 1994 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines
for International Operations (1994 International Antitrust
Guidelines) 3 in Part IV. By way of contrast, Part V of this Note
examines the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act
of 1994, 4 which ideally will allow the Department access to
important antitrust evidence located abroad by promising foreign

2.
U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for
International Operations, reprinted in 55 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1391 (Nov. 17. 1988) (Special Supp.) [hereinafter 1988 International Antitrust
Guidelines]. For a discussion of footnote 159 of the 1988 International Antitrust
Guidelines and its ultimate rescission, see nfra Part Ill of this Note.
3.
U.S. Government's Draft Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for

International Operations, reprinted in 67 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1685, at 490 (Oct. 20, 1994) [hereinafter 1994 International Antitrust Guidelines].
4.
International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 6201-6212 (West Supp. 1995) [hereinafter IAEAA].
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antitrust authorities reciprocal access to evidence from U.S.
businesses. Part VI then explores multilateral solutions to the
problems that hinder international antitrust enforcement, and
concludes that multilateral bodies may be useful in identifying
areas of agreement and promoting consensus in international
antitrust enforcement.
II. THE LEGAL AND PRACTICAL OBSTACLES TO REGULATING FOREIGN
ANTICOMPETITVE CONDUCT

A. Case Law and Statutory Background
In order to analyze the implications of two recent cases
concerning the application of U.S. antitrust law to foreign
businesses and the recently enacted International Antitrust
Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, a brief background of
congressional authority to regulate foreign anticompetitive
conduct is necessary. Congress has statutory authority to
regulate foreign commerce under the Sherman Act, which
declares illegal "[elvery contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce .
with foreign nations." 5 Although the United States Supreme
Court has held a number of times that anticompetitive
6
restrictions on U.S. exports are prohibited by the Sherman Act,
there are limits to the scope of the Sherman Act as applied to
foreign anticompetitive conduct.
One limit has been imposed by prior case law. In United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa),7 the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the Sherman Act is applicable to
foreign conduct, but only if such conduct has an intended effect
on United States commerce.8 However, this "effects" test of

5.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). As the legislative history of the Sherman Act
reveals, to enact it Congress relied upon its power under the Commerce Clause of
the United States Constitution. See 21 CONG. REc. 2456, 2461 (1890).
6.
See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100
(1969) (holding that there was sufficient evidence to sustain a Sherman Act
violation based on a Canadian patent pool's refusal to license imported goods in
the Canadian radio and television market); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide
& Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962) (ruling that a conspiracy to monopolize or

restrain the foreign commerce of the United States in vanadium oxide is not
outside the reach of the Sherman Act just because part of the conduct occurred
in Canada).
7.
148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
8.
Id. at 443-44. The Alcoa decision carries almost Supreme Court

stature, since the Court only certified the case to the Second Circuit because the
Court lacked a quorum of six qualified justices. See Marina Lao, Jurisdictional
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extraterritorial jurisdiction was deemed incomplete by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of

America.9 To the Alcoa effects test, the Ninth Circuit added the
interests of other nations in adopting a "jurisdictional rule of
reason"' 0 that balanced numerous factors in deciding whether a
United States court has jurisdiction over foreign conduct that
affects U.S. commerce."
To clarify how domestic antitrust law reaches foreign conduct
affecting U.S. export trade, Congress amended the Sherman Act
by enacting the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of
1982 (FTAIA).1 2 Read together, the Sherman Act and the FTAIA

Reach of the U.S. Antitrust Laws: Yokosuka and Yokota, and "Footnote 159"
For the Supreme Court's
Scenarios, 46 RUTGERS L. REv. 821, 828 (1994).
authority to certify such a case to the Second Circuit, see 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1994).
9.
549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). on remand, 574 F. Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal.
1983), aff'd. 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985).
10.
Kingman Brewster is generally credited with coining the phrase
"Jurisdictional rule of reason." See KINGMAN BREWSTER, 1 ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN
BUSINESS ABROAD 446 (1958). In defining the ability of United States antitrust law
to reach foreign conduct, Brewster's jurisdictional rule of reason took into
account the following factors: (1) the relative significance to the alleged violations
of conduct within the United States versus conduct abroad; (2) whether there was
an explicit purpose to harm or affect U.S. business opportunities; (3) the relative
seriousness of effects on the United States as compared with those abroad; (4) the
nationality of the parties involved, and the fairness of applying United States law
to them; (5) the degree of conflict with foreign laws and policies; and (6) the extent
to which conflict can be avoided without serious impairment of the interests of the
United States or the foreign country. Id.
11.
To determine whether jurisdiction should be exercised in antitrust
cases involving foreign parties, the Timberlane court looked at three factors: (1)
the effect or intended effect on the foreign commerce of the United States; (2) the
type and magnitude of the alleged illegal behavior; and (3) the appropriateness of

exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction in light of considerations of international
comity and fairness. 749 F.2d at 1382. The TImberlane test has been approved by
the Third Circuit in Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287,
1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979), by the Fifth Circuit in Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui
& Co., 671 F.2d 876, 884-85 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983),
and by the Tenth Circuit in Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d 864,
869-70 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied. 455 U.S. 1001 (1982). The Seventh Circuit
rejected the Timberlane test in In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248,
1254-55 (7th Cir. 1980), and the D.C. Circuit implicitly rejected it in Laker
Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 948-49 (D.C. Cir.
1984). In 1987. the Restatement (Third) of the ForeignRelations Law of the United
States adopted a Timberlane-like approach. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 (1987). The Supreme Court has yet to
rule on the Timberlane balancing test. In a recent decision, the Court expressly
refused to rule on the merits of the test, saying that "international comity would
not counsel against exercising jurisdiction," even assuming that a court may
decline Jurisdiction over foreign conduct in an appropriate case. Hartford Fire Ins.
Co. v. California, 113 S.Ct. 2891, 2910 (1993).
12.
15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1994).

160
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authorize Congress to regulate trade or commerce that has a
"direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect . . . on
export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a person

engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States ..... 13
Congress intended the "reasonably foreseeable effect" standard to
be an objective, practical standard, which merely codified prior
case law. 14
The enactment of the FTAIA had no effect on
principles of international comity.' 5 After the FTAIA, a court
could still take into account the international nature of the case
in whatever manner it saw fit.
B. Comity Concerns Inherent in the ExtraterritorialApplication of
Antitrust Law
Case law and statutory restrictions are not the only obstacles
that must be considered when the Department seeks to enjoin
foreign anticompetitive conduct through the vehicle of U.S.
antitrust law. International antitrust cases are inherently
different from domestic cases, due to jurisdictional issues,
principles of international comity, and the significance of foreign
government involvement. 16
International law obligates every state to "exercise moderation
and restraint as to the extent of [its] jurisdiction" in order to
"avoid undue encroachment on a jurisdiction more properly
appertaining to . . . another State."' 7 Thus, every exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction by one country infringes on another
country's sovereignty to some degree. 1 8 And although there has
been a recent trend to limit sovereignty-based defenses to the

13.
Id.
14.
H.R. REP. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2494.
15.
H.R. REP. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1982), reprinted In 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2498 (FTAIA has "no effect on the courts' ability to employ
notions of comity.").
16.
Justice and FTC Issue Draft Guidelines on International Antitrust
Enforcement, 67 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1685, at 489 (Oct. 20.
1994).
17.
Roger P. Alford, The ExtraterritorlalApplication of Antitrust Laws: A
Postscripton Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 34 VA. J, INT'L L. 213, 231 (1994)
(quoting Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J.
4, 105 (Fitzmaurice, J., separate opinion)) (alterations in original).
18.
Lao, supra note 8, at 821. The United States has traditionally been the
most aggressive nation in exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction in antitrust cases,
but the European Community has become increasingly aggressive in recent years.
Id. at 821-22 n.1. See, e.g., Cases 89/85, Ahlstrom v. Comm'n (Wood Pulp)
(E.C.J., Sept. 27, 1988), 1988 E.C.R. 5193, 4 C.M.L.R. 901 (1988).
For a
discussion of a similar belief in the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction held by
Japan, see Jiro Tamura, U.S. ExtraterritorialApplication of Antitrust Law to
JapaneseKelretsu, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 385, 392-99 (1993).
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exercise of jurisdiction, 19 it is imperative that the Department
remain sensitive to the interests of foreign states in deciding
whether to prosecute anticompetitive conduct occurring entirely
20
abroad.
A consideration of the interests of foreign states in deciding
whether to prosecute foreign anticompetitive conduct is known as
comity. The traditional notion of comity is "the recognition [that]
one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive,
or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own
citizens." 2 1
This perception of comity involves concepts of
moderation and restraint in the extraterritorial enforcement of
domestic antitrust law.2 2 In many ways, the traditional notion of
comity seems aberrational, because "U.S. courts weighing
nebulous criteria will simply assert the primacy of U.S. interests"
to justify the exercise of jurisdiction.2 3 But the consequences of
relegating the interests of foreign states to a secondary status, at

best, should be of real concern to the Department in deciding

19.
For example, the act of state doctrine has been limited, foreign
government compulsion has been further distinguished from private activity, and
commercial activity has been more clearly exempted from the sovereign immunity
doctrine. Tamura, supranote 18, at 386-87 n.7. See also Barry E. Hawk, Litigating
In an InternationalContext. Special Defenses and Issues, Including Subject Matter
Jurisdiction,Act of State Doctrine, Foreign Government Compulsion and Sovereign
Immunity. 50 ANTITRUST L. J. 559 (1981).
20.
See Tamura, supranote 18, at 386.
21.
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895). The 1988 International
Antitrust Guidelines define comity as "the notion that foreign nations are due
deference when acting within their legitimate spheres of authority." 1988
International Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 2, at S-22.
22.
Joseph P. Griffin, EC and US Extraterritorlality: Activism and
Cooperation, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 353, 376 n.134 (1994) (citing COMMISSION,

64 (1992)).
23.
Alford, supra note 17, at 216. Compare Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
California, 113 S.Ct. 2891, 2910 (1993) (holding that international comity does
not require United States courts to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over
British reinsurers in an antitrust case, despite the fact that the reinsurers
conduct was perfectly consistent with British law and policy) with Montreal
Trading, Ltd. v. Amax Indus., Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 869-70 (10th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1001 (1982) (dismissing a suit because any effects on U.S.
commerce were "insubstantial" and "speculative," and were outweighed by comity
concerns). See J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER. 1 ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BusINESs

TWENTY-FIRST REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY §

ABROAD, § 4.11 n.61 (2d ed. 1981) (discussing the problems that other nations,
specifically Canada, have with United States enforcement officials and United
States courts unilaterally interpreting foreign interests). See also Harold G. Maier,
InterestBalancing and ExtraterrltorlalJurisdiction, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 579, 589-90
(1983) (asserting that courts applying a Timberlane-like balancing test usually
ignore or "give short shrift" to foreign national interests).
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under what circumstances to prosecute foreign anticompetitive
conduct.
Department attacks on foreign conduct that allegedly restrain
U.S. exports may result in strong diplomatic responses. 24 These
responses may range from diplomatic notes of concern and
protest to the enactment of foreign blocking legislation by other
countries. 2 5 The United Kingdom, 26 Australia, 27 and Canada2"
are among the countries that have enacted legislation restricting
or prohibiting enforcement of U.S. antitrust decrees or damage
awards in their jurisdictions. 2 9 Moreover, not only have U.S,
antitrust efforts abroad been blocked in some countries, but there
is always the possibility that foreign governments could attack
30
United States businesses for similar anticompetitive conduct.
When the Department challenges anticompetitive conduct
that is lawful in a foreign country, antitrust prosecution becomes
all the more problematic and diplomatically controversial.3 1
In
these instances, foreign businesses are in a no-win dilemma. On

24.
See Joseph P. Griffin, New U.S. Enforcement Policy Is Assessed, NAT'L
L.J., Mar. 16, 1992, at 23, 25.
25.
Id. For a discussion of the trend of foreign governments reacting with
hostility to the enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws abroad, see ATwoOD &
BREWSTER, supra note 23, at §§ 4.14-.19.
26.
See Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980 and Exchange of
Diplomatic Notes Concerning the Act, reprintedIn 21 I.L.M. 834 (1982).
27.
See Foreign Proceedings (Excess of Jurisdiction) Act No. 3, 1984 Austl.
Acts. P. 8, reprintedin 23 I.L.M. 1088 (1984).
28.
See Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act of 1985, ch. 49, reprinted in
24 I.L.M. 794 (1985).
29.
Although Japan currently has no blocking legislation per se, it has
threatened to consider such legislation. Lao. supra note 8, at 868. Article 200 of
the Japanese Civil Procedure Act does require certain preconditions to be met
before a foreign court's judgment will be deemed valid. This provision was not
intended to block the enforcement of United States court judgments in antitrust
cases; however, that may change in the future in antitrust cases involving
Japanese defendants. Seung Wha Chang, Extraterritorial Application of U.S.
Antitrust Laws to Other Pacific Countries: Proposed Bilateral Agreements for
Resolving InternationalConflicts Within the Pacfic Community, 16 HASTINGS INT'L &
CoMP. L. REv. 295, 301-02 (1993). In Go-Video v. Akai Electric Co., Ltd., 885 F.2d
1406 (9th Cir. 1989). a Korean manufacturer and three Japanese manufacturers
defended a suit in Arizona. Jurisdiction was asserted over the defendants based
on nationwide contacts with the United States, the contacts with the forum
district being irrelevant to the court. Id. at 1414-15. The defendants ultimately
prevailed, but had they lost, and treble damages been awarded to the plaintiff,
one commentator implies that Japan may have invoked Article 24 of the Japanese
Civil Procedure Act to preclude enforcement of the U.S. judgment in Japan.
Chang. supra, at 302 n.46.
30.
Griffin, supra note 24, at 26. See generally Griffin, supra note 22
(comparing recent developments in extraterritoriality jurisprudence in the
European Community and the United States, and the implications that they hold
for international comity concerns in the future).
31.
Griffin, supranote 24, at 25.
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the one hand, they may take advantage of every possible
competitive business practice permitted by their own country's
laws and risk U.S. antitrust prosecution. On the other hand, they
may abide by the generally more stringent United States antitrust
laws, the laws of a country in which they are not domiciled and
with which they have no "minimum contacts,"3 2 and risk losing
out to competitors in their own country.
Thus, in considering the recent developments this Note
discusses in Part III, including the 1992 rescission of footnote 159
of the 1988 International Antitrust Guidelines and the first two
post-rescission antitrust cases brought by the Department, it is
important to consider two .questions.
First, what is the basis of jurisdiction over a foreign
defendant? Subject matter jurisdiction should not legally bar the
prosecution of a foreign defendant under the Sherman Act as
amended by the FTAIA, if the Department can prove a "direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on United States
export trade or commerce. 3 3 However, the terms "direct" and

"substantial" under the FTAIA as yet have not been judicially

interpreted. 3 4 Nonetheless, the Sherman Act as amended by the
FTAIA does not set different jurisdictional standards for citizens
and noncitizens, or for conduct only partially outside the United
States and conduct wholly outside the United States.3 5 "Assuming
that the government chooses its cases well, the 'effects' of foreign
collusion in a 'footnote 159' case . . . would usually be
significantly anticompetitive as well as 'direct, substantial, and
36
reasonably foreseeable.'"

32.
See generally International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945) (establishing that a party's minimum contacts with a state are sufficient to
subject that party to the state's jurisdiction). See also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987). In the typical "footnote 159" cases this
Note discusses in Part Ill, U.S. presence should be assumed not to exist. Lao,
supranote 8, at 858.
33.
See supranotes 12-15 and accompanying text.
34.
Lao, supra note 8, at 840. In its recent decision in Hartford Fire Ins.
Co. v. California,the Supreme Court exercised Jurisdiction under the Sherman Act
over activities undertaken in London by certain British defendants. 113 S.Ct.
2891, 2909 (1993). The defendants, however, had conceded in oral argument
that the Sherman Act applied. Id. (citing Transcript of Defendant's Oral Argument
at 37). Thus, the Court did not reach the issue of defining "direct" and
"substantial" under the FTAIA. In dicta, the Court seemed to suggest that the
FTAIA was inapplicable to the conduct at issue, observing that the FTAIA was
intended to exempt from the Sherman Act export transactions that did not injure
the United States economy. Id. at 2909 n.23.
35.
Lao, supranote 8. at 858.
36.
Id.
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Personal jurisdiction is much more problematic. If a foreign
company has U.S. subsidiaries, then the Department might
consider filing suit against the United States subsidiaries as the
"alter ego" of the foreign company.3 7 However, it is assumed that
a U.S. presence does not exist in a true footnote 159 case.3 8
Based on this assumption, it is difficult to conceive how the
Department can exercise personal jurisdiction in a true footnote
159 case.
If jurisdiction is found to exist, however, the second question
to consider is what are the international implications of
prosecuting foreign anticompetitive conduct?
Under the
traditional comity analysis, arguably, international implications
are paid homage, but are not seriously considered by U.S. courts
3 9
It
that view United States interests with "rose-colored glasses."
is difficult to tell how much consideration the Department gave to
international interests before filing suit in the footnote 159 cases,
since they were settled by consent decree. But it Is easy to

distinguish the traditional comity analysis and even the footnote
159 cases (since litigation was still the means employed by the
Department) from the recent trend toward positive comity
agreements to solve antitrust problems cooperatively. 40 In an age
when nearly one-quarter of U.S. gross domestic output Is related
to trade with other nations, 41 the international implications of
prosecuting foreign anticompetitive conduct in one manner or the
other is not a trivial concern.
III.

THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S CHANGE IN POLICY: THE RESCISSION
OF FOOTNOTE 159

A. Attacking Restraints on Export Opportunities
Since the end of the Reagan Administration, the
Department's policy on international antitrust enforcement has

37.
Under an alter ego theory, the Department might use agency and
"piercing the corporate veil" principles to assert personal Jurisdiction over a
foreign company on the premise that foreign "parents" were transacting business
in the United States through such subsidiaries. Id. at 847.
38.
See supra note 32.
39.
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
40.
See Infra Part V of this Note for a definition of positive comity and for a
discussion of the IAEAA, the first piece of positive comity legislation to assist in
international antitrust enforcement.
41.
Excerpts from H.R. REP. No. 772, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994),
reprintedin 67 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1684, at 451 (Oct. 13, 1994)
(citing Economic Report of the President, Feb. 1994, at 206-07).
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changed markedly. In the 1988 International Antitrust
Guidelines, 4 2 the Department included a significant footnote.
Footnote 159 stated:
Although the FTAIA extends jurisdiction under the Sherman
Act to conduct that has a direct, substantial and reasonably
foreseeable effect on the export trade or export commerce of a
person engaged in such commerce in the United States, the
Department Is concerned only with adverse effects on competition
harm U.S. consumers by reducing output or raising
that would
43
prices.

Thus, by exercising self-restraint in terms of jurisdiction, the
Department stated that it would only challenge foreign
anticompetitive conduct that directly harmed United States
44
consumers.
In 1992, the Department rescinded footnote 159, discarding
this self-imposed jurisdictional constraint. 4 5 Without footnote
159, the Department could challenge anticompetitive conduct

that restrained United States exports if.
(1) [T]he conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect on exports of goods or services from the
United States;
(2) [Tlhe conduct involves anticompetitive activities that
violate the U.S. antitrust laws-in most cases, group
boycotts, collusive pricing, and other exclusionary

activities; and
(3) U.S. courts have jurisdiction over4 6foreign persons or
corporations engaged in such conduct.

42.
For a discussion of the "legal value" of the 1988 International Antitrust
Guidelines, see Wilbur L. Fugate, The New Justice Department Antitrust
Enforcement Guidelinesfor InternationalOperations-A Reflection of Reagan and,
Perhaps, Bush Administration Antitrust Policy, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 295, 297-300
(1989).
43.
1988 International Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 2, at S-21 n.159.
44.
See Yoshio Ohara, The New U.S. Policy on the ExtraterritorlalApplication
of Antitrust Laws, and Japan's Response, WORLD COMP. L. & ECON. REV., Mar.
1994, at 49, 49 (Footnote 159 "had been interpreted as prohibiting challenges to
anticompetitive conduct in foreign markets, unless there was direct harm to U.S.
consumers."). For example, the footnote would have precluded challenges to
most, if not all, agreements to limit purchases from United States exporters, or to
fix the price paid for such exports. Lao, supra note 8. at 823-24.
45.
Justice Department Will Challenge Foreign Restraints on U.S. Exports
50,084 (Apr. 3, 1992)
Under Antitrust Laws, 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
[hereinafter ForeignRestraints].
46.
Justice Department's April 3 Statement of Enforcement Policy:
Departmentof JusticePolicy RegardingAnticompetitive Conduct That Restricts U. S.

166

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 29:155

The Department reasoned that Congress did not intend the

antitrust laws to be limited to cases where there is direct harm to

consumers. 4 7 Since both exports and imports are important to
the United States economy, the Department's concern for
48
competition should not be limited to imports.
The rescission of footnote 159 was met with great controversy
internationally. Many countries objected to the application of
United States antitrust law to remedy foreign anticompetitive
behavior, asserting that this was a matter to be resolved via trade
negotiations and agreements, not litigation. 4 9 Although the
Department stated that the new policy "has general application
and is aimed at no particular foreign market," o many believed
that Japan was the reason for the rescission of footnote 159.51
Japan itself called the new United States policy "a violation of
national sovereignty that is contrary to international law."5 2 Not
only was Japan concerned with the extraterritorial application of
United States domestic law, but the Japanese Federal Trade
Commission also feared that U.S. exporters might initiate
numerous private suits against Japan or Japanese businesses in
order to obtain profit.5 3 Some worry that because of the strong
opposition to the rescission of footnote 159, the diplomatic costs
of the new enforcement policy may ultimately outweigh the
54
domestic benefits.
The Department mentioned two cases as "precedent"55 , for its

new policy.5 6

The first was Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine

Exports, 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1560, at 483 (April 9, 1992)
[hereinafter Enforcement Statement].
47.
Foreign Restraints, supra note 45 (quoting James F. Rill. Assistant
Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division).
48.
Id.
49.
Lori B. Morgan & Helaine S. Rosenbaum, U.S. Department of Justice
Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 34 HARv. INT'L L.J. 192, 202-03 & n.61 (1993).
50.
Enforcement Statement, supra note 46, at 483.
51.
See Ohara, supra note 44, at 51. Part of this belief probably stems
from the fact that the United States currently has a trade deficit with Japan, and
from efforts to open up Japan to U.S. imports. More specifically, many members
of the United States Congress consider the Japanese practice of keLretsu, which Is
a system of close cooperation between parts suppliers and manufacturers or
between manufacturers and dealers, as a vertical restraint on trade illegal under
United States antitrust law. Id.
52.
Morgan & Rosenbaum, supra note 49, at 203.
53.
Ohara, supra note 44, at 52.
54.
Morgan & Rosenbaum, supra note 49, at 202-03.
55.
Obviously, cases settled by consent decree are of no legal value as
precedent. See Lao, supra note 8, at 836. Nonetheless, what the Department has
done in the past is important, and may reflect what It intends to do in the future
to attack restraints on United States export opportunities.
56.
Enforcement Statement, supra note 46, at 483.

1996]

ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY

Research, Inc., one of the Canadian PatentPool cases. 5 7 In Zenith,
Canadian subsidiaries of United States manufacturers that were
members of a Canadian patent pool agreed to grant licenses only
to home entertainment firms manufacturing in Canada.5 8 The
pool refused to grant licenses to U.S. firms that exported radios
and televisions, among other products, to Canada.5 9 Aside from
the private patent suit filed by Zenith, the Department fled suit,

alleging a violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
Rejecting the defendants' argument that Canadian activities
should be governed by Canadian law, the district court stated
that "a conspiracy to restrain the domestic or foreign commerce of
the United States to which any [U.S.] company is a party violates
the Sherman Act irrespective of the fact that the conduct
a0
complained of occurs in whole or in part in foreign countries."
Since Zenith did not involve a truly foreign conspiracy, it is
questionable whether its precedential value in a footnote 159
case-which is assumed to involve a foreign conspiracy among
62
61
entirely foreign participants -wfl1 be compromised.
Another case cited as precedent by the Department for its
63
rescission of footnote 159 was United States v. C. Itoh & Co., Ltd.
In this case, a group of eight Japanese shellfish buyers were
charged with price-flxing under U.S. antitrust law for agreeing on
the prices to be paid for processed tanner crab imported from
Alaska. The Japanese shellfish buyers ultimately agreed, by
consent decree, to refrain for a period of ten years from
exchanging information with other importers concerning prices or
other terms and conditions for the purchase of processed seafood
from the United States. 6 4 Further, they agreed not to attend or
participate in any meeting where such topics were to be
discussed.6 5 Thus, in Itoh, U.S. antitrust law was applied to an
exclusively-foreign buyers' cartel on foreign soil that restrained

57.
Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 239 F. Supp. 51 (N.D.
Ill.
1965), rev'd, 388 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1967), affd in part; rev'd In part, 395 U.S.

100 (1969).

Zenith is a private patent infringement case.

The rest of the

Canadian Patent Pool cases are civil cases filed by the Department: United States
v. General Electric Co., Westinghouse Electric Corp. and N.V. Philips, 1962 Trade
Cas. (CCH), 1 70,342; 1 70,428; 70,546 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (consent judgments).
58.
395 U.S. at 105-06.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
decree).
64.
65.

Id.
Id. at 100.
See supra note 32.
Lao, supranote 8, at 839.
1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 65,010 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (consent
1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH), 1 65,010 at 70,608.
Id.
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United States export opportunities. 66 With the rescission of
was the type of case the
footnote 159, it appeared that this
67
Department intended to prosecute.
B. The FirstTwo "Footnote159" Cases

In discussing the recent footnote 159 cases, 68 it is important
to note that these cases are not being discussed for their
precedential value per se.6 9 Instead, these cases are being
discussed as predictors of the distinct trend toward greater
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law. They are being
discussed to better understand the prospects and problems
associated with international antitrust enforcement. They are
being discussed to emphasize that these are real cases, with
70
tangible consequences to the United States and foreign nations.

66.
The only other case against an exclusively-foreign buyers' cartel on
foreign soil that restrained United States export opportunities is Daishowa Int'l v.
North Coast Export Co., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 64,774 (N.D. Cal. 1982)
(consent decree). Here, a U.S. export trade association, not the United States
government, filed antitrust charges against a Japanese paper company. The court
denied the Japanese company's motion to dismiss the alleged charges under the
Sherman Act for lack of jurisdiction. Applying a Timberiane test, the court stated:
It is not clear from the comity and fairness decisions whether a conflict of
law exists.... Additionally, there is no evidence of harm to the Japanese
economy from the alleged activities. On the other hand, both parties are
now in court in the United States. Because the party asserting the
antitrust violations is [a U.S.] corporation, this Court has great interest in
providing a convenient forum and a prompt remedy. In addition, no
remedy may be available under Japanese antitrust law for this [U.S.]
corporation. Due to the serious nature of the anticompetitive conduct
alleged, and the foreseeability of the harm occurring from the alleged

activities, the balance of factors under Timberlane directs that this Court

refuse to dismiss or strike North Coast's antitrust claims and antitrust
defenses.
1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH),
64,774 at 71,789-90.
Interestingly, personal
jurisdiction over this Japanese corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary were
not really at Issue in Dalshowa, because the foreign company was suing in
California for breach of contract. Id. at 71,786.
67.
Lao, supra note 8, at 836-37.
68.
Even though footnote 159 of the 1988 International Antitrust
Guidelines was rescinded by the Department in 1992, many commentators still
refer to cases brought by the Department because of the 1992 policy change as
footnote 159 cases. See Lao, supra note 8, at 824; Joseph P. Griffin, Antitrust Law:
Recent Cases Show that the Justice Department Is Serious About Taking Action
Against Foreign Companies Whose Overseas Conduct Restrains U.S. Exports, NAT'L
L. J. (Aug. 29, 1994), at B5-B6.
69.
See supra note 55.
70.
In two other disputes where antitrust charges were threatened, but not
filed, the United States obtained approximately $70 million from Japanese firms
for rigging bids on contracts with United States armed forces bases in Japan. For
an in-depth discussion of the Yokosuka and Yokota cases, see Lao, supra note 8,
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In short, footnote 159 cases are being discussed not to define the
scope of subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over
entirely foreign anticompetitive conduct, but to emphasize that
many of these jurisdictional issues have yet to be contested. For
instance, what will be the result when foreign anticompetitive
conduct clearly affects U.S. export commerce, but there is no U.S.
subsidiary to sue, and the potential defendant will not consent to
jurisdiction in the United States? Jurisdictional and comity
questions such as these will be answered by analyzing the
provisions of the proposed 1994 International Antitrust
Guidelines.
In May 1994, the Department announced its first case since
72
71
the rescission of footnote 159, United States v. Pllkington, plc.

In a complaint and proposed consent decree against a British
company and its U.S. subsidiary, the Department alleged that
Pilkington's patent and trade secret licenses contained geographic
and use restrictions designed to limit the export of foreign-made
glass to the United States as well as the export of glass produced
The Department also alleged that the
in the United States.7
licensed trade secrets had diminished in value to the point that

restrictions in the licenses were no longer justified.74 Finally, the
was enforcing trade secrets
Department contended that Pilkington 75
that were matters of public knowledge.
Contending that the restrictions had a direct, substantial,
and reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S. export opportunities,
the Department based its theory for subject matter jurisdiction on
the 1982 FTAIA. 7 6 Without such restrictions, U.S. businesses
could compete for contracts to design and construct glass plants

at 845-62. Lao says that, based on a press release issued in Yokota, the United
States government intended to support jurisdiction with a showing of an adverse
effect on the United States export of construction and telecommunications goods
and services. Id. at 859. Lao also analyzes the suggestion that the "effect" on
United States exports might be the impact of overcharging United States
taxpayers in their capacity as taxpayers or consumers. Id. at 862. Lao concludes
that this latter argument would in reality be an effect on United States domestic
commerce (imports). Id.
71.
Griffin, supra note 68, at B5 (citing Dept. of Justice Press Release,
Justice Department Files FirstAntitrust Suit Against Foreign Company Since 1992
Policy Change (May 26. 1994)).
72.
1994-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 70,842 (D. Ariz. 1994) (proposed consent
decree); 59 Fed. Reg. 30604 (June 14, 1994) (competitive impact statement).
73.
Griffin, supra note 68, at B5. See also 59 Fed. Reg. 30604, at 30608.
74.
Griffin, supra note 68, at B5. See also 59 Fed. Reg. 30604, at 30608.
75.
Griffin, supra note 68, at B5. See also 59 Fed. Reg. 30604, at 30608.
76.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 6(a) (1994). See also supra notes 5, 12-15 and

accompanying text.
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77
outside the United States and would export these services.
Also, regardless of who built such plants, United States
construction suppliers could export construction materials. 78
The Department's theory of personal jurisdiction was not
elaborated upon in the proposed consent decree. One
commentator contends that the Department was prepared to
argue that Pilkington owned and licensed United States
intellectual property rights, and also owned eighty percent of a
U.S. glass maker, thus making Pilkington subject to personal
jurisdiction in the United States. 7 9 If this was the case, then
Pilkington is not a true footnote 159 case, because it is assumed
80
that a U.S. presence does not exist in a footnote 159 case.
Personal jurisdiction over P.lkington was actually asserted via
consent in this particular case, because Pilkington, while denying
82
the Department's allegations,8 1 wanted to avoid costly litigation.
Pilkington agreed not to enforce certain trade secrets licensed to

United States licensees.8 3 However, certain technology that did
from being labeled
qualify as trade secrets would not be precluded
84
confidential by Pilkington in the future.

In the second footnote 159 case announced by the
Department, United States v. MCI Communications Corp.,8 5 a
complaint and proposed consent decree were filed contesting a
proposal by British Telecommunications to purchase twenty
percent of the shares of MCI Communications and form a joint
venture providing global telecommunications services. The
Department alleged that this was a violation of Section 7 of the
Clayton Act. 8 6 The Department feared that such a vertically
integrated joint venture would give British telecommunications

77.
59 Fed. Reg. 30604, at 30608.
Id. It is estimated that when a United States firm designs and
78.
supervises construction of a foreign plant costing approximately $100 million,
$35-$50 million of that eventually flows back into the United States economy in
orders for domestic materials, equipment, and services. It is further estimated
that, if not restrained, United States exporters of float glass technology may
obtain between 10% and 50% of the 30 to 50 new plants projected to be built
over the next few years. Thus, potential export sales for contractors, fabricators.
and suppliers could amount to between $500 million and $2.5 billion. Id.
Griffin, supranote 68, at B6.
79.
80.
See Lao, supra note 8, at 858.
81.
Griffin, supra note 68, at B6.
82.
Id.
83.
59 Fed. Reg. 30604, at 30605-06.
Id.
84.
85.
7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 50,761 (D.D.C. 1994) (proposed consent
decree); 59 Fed. Reg. 33009 (June 27, 1994) (competitive impact statement).
86.
59 Fed. Reg. 33009. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994). Section 7 of the
Clayton Act prohibits certain acquisitions, the effect of which may be
.substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. 9
18.
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companies an unfair advantage over U.S. telecommunications
87
companies in ease of access to the United Kingdom network.
telephone calls
This in turn would raise the price of international
88
services.
telecommunications
other
and
But as was the case in Pilkington, the Department's theories
of jurisdiction were not put to the test. MCI and British
Telecommunications accepted the proposed consent decree,
agreeing to publish rates, terms, and conditions of access to
British Telecommunications network, information that was
otherwise confidential. 89 The decree included provisions that
were designed to prevent discrimination against U.S. carriers in
offering international telecommunications services. 90 According
to the Department, the terms of the decree were tailored to avoid
direct United States governmental involvement in British
91
Telecommunications' network.

Future cases, in which a foreign company may not consent to

jurisdiction in the United States, will more clearly delineate the
implications of the Department's footnote 159 policy. If these are
truly footnote 159 cases, the potential for dispute over the
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law remains likely.
One can only speculate how the Department might have argued
that U.S. courts had personal jurisdiction over a foreign monopoly
like British Telecommunications had the company not consented
Also unknown is how important
to the proposed decree.
international comity concerns were to the Department before it
This question is particularly
decided to fle a complaint.
intriguing since the United Kingdom does have blocking
legislation that prevents the enforcement of judgments by certain
foreign jurisdictions. 92 It is clear that the Department has
assumed an aggressive stance, embodied in the rescission of
footnote 159, against anticompetitive conduct in foreign
jurisdictions that is perceived to restrain U.S. export
opportunities. How these jurisdictional and comity concerns
figure into future antitrust enforcement efforts will be answered

Griffin, supra note 68, at B6.
87.
Id. (citing Dept. of Justice Press Release 3 (June 15, 1994)).
88.
Id.
89.
Id.
90.
Id. Several weeks after the consent decree was entered, the United
91.
Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry announced that AT&T would be
granted a license to provide services throughout the United Kingdom. Andrew
Adonis, AT & T to be GrantedTelecoms License, FIN. TIMES, July 9-10, 1994, at 7.
See Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980 and Exchange of
92.
Diplomatic Notes Concerning the Act, supra note 26.

172

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 29:155

in the context of the proposed 1994 International Antitrust
Guidelines.
IV. THE 1994 ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS:
AN ANSWER TO JURISDICTIONAL AND COMITY CONCERNS?

On October 13, 1994, the Department and the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) proposed the 1994 International Antitrust
Guidelines 93 (Guidelines), which will supersede the 1988
International Antitrust Guidelines. The new Guidelines have
three distinct features.
First, they take a broader view of
antitrust jurisdiction involving imports. 9 4
Second, the new
Guidelines confirm the 1992 rescission of footnote 159 of the
1988 International Antitrust Guidelines. 9 5 Finally, the new
Guidelines discuss the practices and policies of the Department
and the FTC for seeking evidence in foreign countries. This Note
confines its discussion primarily to the second and third features
of the new Guidelines.
As has been consistently implied, in the event that a footnote
159 case is ever litigated, subject matter jurisdiction over the
foreign party should not represent the major obstacle. In a world
in which economic transactions observe no boundaries, the
United States has by no means been the only nation to recognize
the effects doctrine of jurisdiction.9 6 Under U.S. law, Section I(B)
of the FTAIA codifies this effects doctrine as applied to restraints
on U.S. exports. 9 7 The Guidelines confirm that if "(1) the conduct
has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on
exports of goods or services from the United States, and (2) the
U.S. courts can obtain jurisdiction over the foreign persons or
corporations engaged in such conduct," 9 8 then a U.S. court has
subject matter jurisdiction over the case.
Personal jurisdiction is the unknown factor in analyzing
these footnote 159 cases, and will probably pose the largest
93.
1994 International Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3. The 1988
International Antitrust Guidelines will be withdrawn when the 1994 International
Antitrust Guidelines are adopted in final form. Id.
94.
See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993).
95.
See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
96.
1994 International Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3, at 495. Other
governments that endorse the effects doctrine of jurisdiction include the
European Union, Canada, Germany, France, Australia, and the Czech and Slovak
Republics. Id. at 495 n.44. See also Cases 89/85, AhIstrom v. Comm'n (Wood
Pulp) (E.C.J., Sept. 27, 1988), 1988 E.C.R. 5193, 4 C.M.L.R. 901 (1988).
97.
15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1994). See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
98.
1994 International Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3. at 496. For an
example demonstrating subject matter jurisdiction under the new Guidelines, see
Id. at 497 (Illustrative Example F).
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obstacle for the Department should a true footnote 159 case ever
be litigated. All of the cases this Note previously analyzes, both
those before 198899 and those after the rescission of footnote 159
in 1992,1o have been settled by consent decree. Section 4.1 of
the Guidelines concludes that the Department will bring suit only
if it believes that personal jurisdiction exists under the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution.' I L Personal
jurisdiction may exist, the 1994 International Antitrust
Guidelines confirm, if a party acts as an agent or transacts
business in the United States through a related corporation that
is in reality the alter ego of the foreign party.' 0 2 Thus, the
03
Department's assertion of personal jurisdiction in Pilkington,'
had it been forced to make one, may have satisfied the standard
0 4
established in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington.1
Under the Guidelines, the personal jurisdiction issue is less
I0 5
clear when considering United States v. MCI Communications.
On the one hand, British Telecommunications was purchasing
twenty percent of the shares of MCI-a U.S. corporation. On the
other hand, British Telecommunications is a foreign monopoly
power. It is difficult to imagine how a purely foreign export cartel
or a foreign monopoly power could be subject to personal
jurisdiction in the United States. This is one reason why the
International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, that

this Note discusses in Part V, might prove useful. If the United
States cannot obtain jurisdiction over these foreign cartels, the
Department might ask the foreign antitrust authority to
investigate and remedy the cartel activity itself, supported by the
reciprocal promise that the United States will do the same in a

99.
See United States v. C. Itoh & Co., Ltd., 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH)
65,010 (W.D. Wash. 1982); Daishowa Int'l v. North Coast Export Co., 1982-2
Trade Cas. (CCH)
64,774 (N.D. Cal. 1982). See also supra notes 63-67 and
accompanying text.
100.
See United States v. Pflkington plc, 1994-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,842
(D. Ariz. 1994); see also supra notes 72-84 and accompanying text (discussing the
Pllkington case). See United States v. MCI Communications Corp., 7 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH)
50,761 (D.D.C. 1994); see also supra notes 85-91 and
accompanying text (discussing the MCI case).
101.
1994 International Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3, at 501. See
generally International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
102.
1994 International Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3. at 501.
103. See supra text accompanying note 79.
104.
326 U.S. 310 (1945). See also cases cited supra note 32.
105.
See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
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future investigation of U.S. competitive activity by the foreign
authority. 0 6
Another unknown factor in footnote 159 cases concerns the
role of comity in the Department's decisions to file antitrust
charges attacking foreign practices. In addressing many of the
concerns inherent in the extraterritorial application of U.S.
antitrust laws, the Guidelines list eight factors to be considered
07
as part of a comity analysis by the Department.1
One prominent factor is the degree of conflict with foreign law
or articulated foreign economic policies. A true conflict between
U.S. antitrust laws and foreign laws will probably counsel against
the Department filing antitrust charges. However, the Guidelines
suggest, as the Supreme Court in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
California already made clear, that the word "conflict" will be
interpreted strictly.'0 8 As the Court in Hartford Fire stated, if the
person or business subject to regulation can comply with the laws
of both nations, then no conflict exists.' 0 9 As more countries
adopt antitrust or competition laws compatible with those of the
United States, the focus will continue to shift from resolving
conflicts in laws to exploring who should enforce antitrust actions
and what remedies should be available." 0
Whether a foreign country encourages or prohibits certain
anticompetitive practices in its territory is a relevant factor In

106. If the country refuses to cooperate with the Department and Is not
amenable to jurisdiction in the United States, the Department Is not without
enforcement options. One option is to file suit in the country of the foreign
business. This, of course, could mean that United States antitrust law may not be
applied. Instead, the law of the foreign jurisdiction may be applied to determine
the legality of the conduct occurring in that Jurisdiction. Another possibility is to
pursue a satisfactory solution to the problem through trade negotiations.
107. In performing a comity analysis, the Department and the FTC should
take into account the following eight factors:
(1) (T]he relative significance to the alleged violation of conduct within the
United States, as compared to conduct abroad; (2) the nationality of the
persons involved in or affected by the conduct; (3) the presence or absence
of a purpose to affect United States consumers, markets, or exporters; (4)
the relative significance and foreseeability of the effects of the conduct on
the United States as compared to the effects abroad; (5) the existence of
reasonable expectations that would be furthered or defeated by the action;
(6) the degree of conflict with foreign law or articulated foreign economic
policies; (7) the effect on foreign enforcement; and (8) the effectiveness of
foreign enforcement.
1994 International Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3, at 497.
108. Id. at 497-98.
109. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2910 (1993)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 403, cmt. e (1987)).
110. 1994 International Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3. at 497-98.
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considering the degree of conflict with foreign law.1 1 1
Presumably, the more a foreign country encourages a certain
course of conduct, the more the Department should worry about
placing fundamentally irreconcilable obligations on a foreign
business. If "encourages" means "suggests," then the Court in
Hartford Fire stated that no conflict exists for comity purposes
If
because a business can comply with both laws. 1 12
"encourages" really signifies "mandates," then the Guidelines
seem to advise against filing a complaint. 1 13 If the conduct in
question is prohibited by both U.S. and foreign antitrust laws, the
Department must decide whether the United States (as opposed
pursue antitrust charges and, if so,
to the foreign country) should
1 14
seek.
should
it
remedy
what
Other factors relevant to a comity analysis include the degree
of harm caused by the foreign cartel to the United States, whether
foreign parties purposefully benefited from doing business with
the United States, and whether a foreign authority comparable to
the Department or the FTC can more effectively take action to
address the anticompetitive effects on U.S. commerce. 1 15 This
Note will address this last factor, working cooperatively with
foreign antitrust enforcement authorities, in the context of the
newly enacted International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act
of 1994.
V. "POSITIVE COMITY" LEGISLATION: THE INTERNATIONAL
ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1994

ANTITRUST

A. PriorLimitations to Antitrust CooperationBetween Nations

Comity considerations, as this Note discusses in Parts II-IV,
might affect the Department's decision whether to prosecute
foreign anticompetitive conduct under U.S. antitrust law. These
considerations, traditionally called "negative comity,"" 6 involve
concepts of moderation and restraint in the assertion of national

111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
HartfordFire, 113 S.Ct. at 2910.
1994 International Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3, at 497-98.
Id. at 498.

115.

Id.

116.

For a brief explanation of the term "negative comity" and its

implications, see Ohara, supra note 44, at 52-53. Other commentators simply
refer to "negative comity" as the traditional notion of comity.
note 22, at 376.

See Griffin, supra
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But in the last few years, there have arisen more

examples of "positive comity," where countries seek to work
together to remedy anticompetitive conduct and to avoid disputes
under international law concerning assertions of extraterritorial
jurisdiction. One commentator has concluded that any impact
that positive comity might have will be marginal:
It is not realistic to expect one government to prosecute its citizens
solely for the benefit of another. It is no accident that this has not
happened in the past, and it is unlikely to happen in the future.
We should not expect the principle of positive comity ...to impact
dramatically on the proposition
that laws are written and enforced
1 18
to protect national interests.

Nonetheless, U.S. antitrust authorities have urged for legislation

to assist them in investigating and prosecuting violations of U.S.
antitrust law in the international marketplace. Until the
enactment of the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance

Act of 1994 (IAEAA), such investigations undertaken unilaterally
have been met by foreign blocking statutes or foreign sovereignty
concerns, which quite often restricted access to important
evidence located abroad."19
Compared with other areas of law, the antitrust field has
traditionally
been
constrained
in
its
investigation
of
anticompetitive activity abroad. For almost a decade, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has concluded
bilateral agreements with foreign securities authorities to share
information and provide reciprocal investigatory assistance. 120
Having the authority to offer its foreign counterparts reciprocal
assistance has put the SEC in an excellent position to "police the
internationalized [securities] market."12 1 In addition to securities
enforcement, significant advances have also been made in the
areas of taxation and money laundering via mutual assistance

117. Griffin, supra note 22, at 376 n.134.
118.
Id. at 377 (quoting James R. Atwood, Positive Comly-Is It a Positive
Step?, 1992 FORDHAM CoRP.L. INST. 79, 87 (Barry Hawk ed., 1993)).
119. Excerpts from H.R. REP.No. 772, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted In 67
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1684, at 451 (Oct. 13, 1994); excerpts from
S. REP.No. 388, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 67 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1684, at 457 (Oct. 13, 1994).
120. ClintonAdmLnistration Looks to Cooperative EnforcementAsslstance and
Other Cooperative Mechanisms to Strengthen Antitrust Enforcement, 9 INT'1
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 402, 404 (1993). Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 gives the SEC authority to negotiate memoranda of understanding
under which it can ask for and give assistance to its counterparts abroad. See 15
U.S.C. § 78(a) et seq. (1994). The SEC has concluded fifteen memoranda of

understanding with foreign countries, which puts it in daily contact with Its
foreign counterparts. ASIL Panel Outlines International Enforcement In the Clinton
AdmIntstraton, 10 INT'L ENFoRCEMENT L. REP. 204, 204-06 (1994).
121.
Excerpts from S. RaP. No. 388, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., supra note 119,
at 458.
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agreements. 1 22 The Working Party of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Committee for
Competition Law and Policy has studied these advances to
determine if they might apply to the realm of antitrust
mutual assistance and
enforcement, where the need for
123
information sharing is just as great.
The United States has entered into a number of cooperative
relationships with foreign countries in recent years. In 1990, the
United States and Canada signed a mutual legal assistance treaty
(MLAT) covering criminal matters. 12 4 In 1994, this MLAT was
used in a joint effort by the Justice Department, the Canadian
Bureau of Competition Policy, and the Canadian Department of
Justice to break up a cartel earning $120 million annually in the
fax paper market. 12 5 Absent the cooperation and assistance of
Canadian governmental agencies, the Department would have been
unable to prosecute this conspiracy because "key evidence ...

was

located in Canada and beyond the reach of [U.S.] investigative
12 7
capabilities." 126 But, of the at least thirteen MLATs in force,
only the MLAT with Canada explicitly covers antitrust
enforcement. 1 28 The other treaties are confined to criminal
matters, and29in most countries antitrust violations are not
criminalized.1
United States antitrust authorities have also entered into
nontreaty agreements, or memoranda of understanding, with

122. Clinton Admlnistration Looks to CooperativeEnforcementAssistance and
Other Cooperative Mechanisms to Strengthen Antitrust Enforcement, supra note
120, at 404.
123. Id. at 403-04.
124. Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Mar. 18, 1985,
U.S.-Can., reprintedin 24 I.L.M. 1092 (1985).
125.
See United States v. Kanzaki Specialty Papers, Inc., 6 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 45,094 (D. Mass. 1994) (charges were filed in the United States and in
Canada against a Japanese corporation, two U.S. subsidiaries of Japanese
companies, and a former president of one of the United States subsidiaries for
their involvement in a price fixing conspiracy that raised the price of fax paper by
approximately 10%; the defendants pleaded guilty and agreed to pay criminal
fines totaling over $6 million).
126. Blngaman Briefs Seminar on InternationalFronts, 67 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1687, at 543 (Nov. 3, 1994).
127. The Department cites 13 criminal mutual legal assistance treaties
currently in force, with the governments of Canada, Switzerland, the Netherlands,
Spain, Italy, Turkey, Thailand, Morocco, Mexico, Argentina, Uruguay, the
Bahamas, and the Cayman Islands. MLATs with Panama and Nigeria are awaiting
Senate consideration, and MLATs with Belgium and Jamaica have been ratified
by the Senate, but are awaiting action by the other country. Excerpts from H.R.
REP. No. 772, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), supra note 119, at 451 n.8.
128. Id. at 451.
129. Id.
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But these agreements represented diplomatic

gestures
more
than
substantive
provisions
facilitating
international antitrust enforcement. This resulted from the fact
that, until the passage of the IAEAA, domestic antitrust laws
restricted the ability of the Department and the FTC to share
information obtained under compulsory process.' 3 4 Section 4 of
the Antitrust Civil Process Act,' 3 5 sections 6(f) and 21 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 13 6 and Rule 6(e) of the Federal

Rules of Criminal Procedure 137 all severely constrained the ability
of the Department and the FTC to share information with foreign
authorities. 3 8 The United States could hardly persuade foreign
nations to provide it with useful, confidential Information about
competitive practices when the United States could not promise
the same information in return.13 9 Although these memoranda of
understanding did not facilitate cooperation among United States
and foreign antitrust authorities in the manner in which the
Department had desired, perhaps such agreements were
necessary to spark information flow between antitrust
authorities. 140

130.

Agreement Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, June 29,

1982, U.S.-Aus., 34 T.I.A.S. No. 10,365, reprintedIn 21 I.L.M. 702 (1982).
131.
Memorandum of Understanding as to Notification, Consultation, and
Cooperation with Respect to the Application of National Antitrust Laws, Mar. 9,
1984, U.S.-Can., 23 I.L.M. 275 (1984).
132. Agreement on Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business
Practices, June 23, 1976, U.S.-F.R.G., 27 U.S.T. 1956.
133.
Agreement on Application of Competition Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, U.S.E.C.. reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1491 (1991). This particular agreement was
invalidated on August 9, 1994 by the European Court of Justice because the
European Commission did not have the power to conclude the antitrust
agreement. The European Commission intends to take the steps necessary to
have the agreement concluded in the proper manner. Griffin, supra note 68, at
B6 n.32.
134. Excerpts from H.R. RaP. No. 772, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., supra note
119, at 451.
135.
15 U.S.C. § 1313 (1994).
136.
15 U.S.C. §§ 46, 57b-2 (1994).
137.
FED. R. CrIM. P. 6(e).
138.
Excerpts from H.R. REP. No. 772, 103d Cong. 2d Sess., supra note
119, at 451.
139.
Id.
140.
In the year prior to the agreement between the United States and the
European Community (EC), the United States sent four notifications to the EC to
Investigate certain practices and received two from the EC. In the first two years
after entering into the agreement, United States enforcers sent about sixty
notifications to the EC and received about forty in return. Griffin, supra note 22,
at 375. The agreement also allows private practitioners to approach the
Department to ask the EC to probe into alleged anticompetitive conduct. Finally,
the agreement precludes United States agencies from claiming a lack of resources
as a reason for refusing to act on a complaint about conduct in the EC. Antitrust
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This conclusion is bolstered by considering the recent
investigation of Microsoft's licensing practices in United States v.
Microsoft Corp.141 Faced with antitrust investigations by both the
Department and the European Commission, Microsoft agreed to
waive its confidentiality rights under United States antitrust law
and permit the two authorities to exchange confidential
information. 142 This represented the first joint effort between
United States and European Community enforcement authorities
in initiating, investigating, and settling an antitrust enforcement
action. 143
B. The InternationalAntitrust EnforcementAssistance Act of 1994
The culmination of the Department's efforts to establish a
mechanism to strengthen international antitrust enforcement
capabilities is the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance
Act of 1994 (LEAA),'" which was passed in October of 1994.
The IAEAA is the first legislative step in "response to the very real
threat to business freedom and consumer welfare from foreign

cartel activity, which has no place in our increasingly globalized
economy." 145 In enacting the IAEAA, Congress recognized that
the extraterritorial application of antitrust law was danger-ridden
and required substantial deliberation as well as reciprocal mutual
assistance between antitrust enforcement authorities in the
United States and abroad. 14 6 To this end, the IAEAA seeks to
balance the need of antitrust enforcers for probative evidence
concerning business activities occurring abroad with the need of
businesses competing in an unforgiving international marketplace
to protect confidential information from rivals. 1 4 7 For positive
comity legislation like the IAEAA to be successful in fostering an
attitude of cooperation between United States and foreign
antitrust authorities, U.S. businesses must be able to rely on

Law "Bad Weapon" to Combat Trade Imbalance, Attorney Says, INT'L Bus. & FIN.
DAiLY (BNA), Feb. 2. 1993, availableIn Westlaw, BNA-IBFD database.
71,096 (D.D.C. 1994) (proposed consent
141.
1995-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
decree).
Griffin, supra note 68, at B6.
142.
143. Id.
144. IAEAA, supra note 4.
145. Excerpts from H.R. REP. No. 772, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), supra
note 119, at 450.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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assurances made by foreign authorities that their confidences will
be protected absent evidence of a violation. 148
The IAEAA authorizes the Attorney General of the United
States and the FTC to provide antitrust evidence about U.S.
businesses to assist a foreign antitrust authority "(1) in
determining whether a person has violated or is about to violate
any of the foreign antitrust laws administered or enforced by the
foreign antitrust authority, or (2) in enforcing any of such foreign
antitrust laws." 14 9 Thus, the IAEAA overrides confidentiality
restrictions in the Antitrust Civil Process Act 15 0 and the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 1 freeing the Department or the FTC to
disclose certain evidence to foreign authorities.
But United States assistance is not confined merely to
disclosure of certain evidence. The Attorney General or the FTC
may "conduct investigations to obtain antitrust evidence relating
to a possible violation of the foreign antitrust laws administered
or enforced by the foreign antitrust authority with respect to
which such agreement is in effect ....
152 Such investigations
may be undertaken to determine whether foreign antitrust laws
have been violated and to enforce foreign antitrust laws.15 3
The Attorney General has wide discretion in deciding whether
to honor a request for investigative assistance under the
IAEAA, 15 4 regardless of whether the conduct violates U.S.
antitrust laws.1 55 The only real limitation on the scope of
investigations to assist a foreign antitrust authority is that "[a]
person may not be compelled

.

.

. to give testimony or a

statement, or to produce a document or other thing, in violation
of any legally applicable right or privilege." 1 56 Presumably, in
including such a protective provision, Congress had in mind the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination in criminal
antitrust matters, though nowhere is this stated. To enforce the
investigative powers of the Attorney General and the FTC, the
Attorney General may ask a federal district court to order
testimony or a statement to be given, or a document or other
thing to be produced, to assist in determining whether a violation

148.
149.

Id.
15 U.S.C.A. § 6201 (West Supp. 1995).

150.
151.

See supra note 135.
See supra note 136.

152.
153.

15 U.S.C.A. § 6202(b) (West Supp. 1995).
Id.

154. "No further action shall be taken under this section with respect to any
part of a request [for investigative assistance] that has been denied by the
Attorney General." Id. § 6202(a).
155. Id. § 6202(c).
156. Id. § 6202(d).
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or is about to occur, or to
of foreign antitrust law has occurred
15 7
enforce such antitrust laws.

But these sections of the IAEAA may have less meaning to
foreign antitrust authorities than Section 6211(2) of the IAEAA
does to the Department and the FTC. Because the United States
is the world's leader in enforcing antitrust laws, if there are
inquiries from foreign antitrust authorities about alleged harmful
anticompetitive activity in the United States, it is more than likely
that U.S. antitrust authorities will prefer to prosecute under U.S.
antitrust law. Under Section 6211(2), neither the Attorney
General nor the FTC may conduct an investigation under Section
6202, apply for an order under Section 6203, or otherwise provide
evidence to a foreign antitrust authority, unless an antitrust
mutual assistance agreement is in effect. Such an agreement will
be in effect only if the foreign antitrust authority provides:
(A) An assurance that the foreign antitrust authority will provide to
the Attorney General and the Commission assistance that is
comparable In scope to the assistance the Attorney General and the
Commission provide under such agreement or such memorandum;
and
(B) An assurance that the foreign antitrust authority is subject to
laws and procedures that are adequate to maintain securely the
confidentiality of antitrust evidence that may be received under
section 6201, 6202, or 6203 of this title and will give protection to
antitrust evidence received under such section that is not less than
under the laws of the United States to such
the protection provIded
15 8
antitrust evidence.

These

specifications

require

that

the

arrangement

be

reciprocal-that the foreign antitrust authority provide similar
antitrust investigatory assistance in return-and that the foreign

antitrust authority keep sensitive business data confidential and
use it only for law enforcement purposes. 159 By giving United
States authorities access to valuable evidence that has not been
available in the past, these provisions will certainly assist the
Department and the FTC in prosecuting foreign anticompetitive
conduct that affects U.S. exports (or imports). Yet, the
confidentiality provisions seem strict, in order to protect sensitive
information that U.S. businesses may otherwise be reluctant to
divulge to foreign antitrust authorities.

157. Id. § 6203(a). Such an application should be filed by the Attorney
General in the United States district court for the district in which a person

resides, is found, or transacts business. Id.
158. Id. § 6211(2) (emphasis added).
159.
Excerpts from H.R. REP. No. 772, 103d Cong.. 2d Sess., supra note
119, at 450.
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An additional factor that the Attorney General or the FTC
must consider is whether conducting an investigation, applying
for a judicial order, or providing the requested evidence is
consistent with the public interest of the United States. 1 60 This
condition was included to provide the Attorney General and the
FTC with discretion in considering whether special circumstances
exist in a particular case that would render the provision of the
requested assistance ill-advised. 16 1 In considering the public
interest of the United States, it is important to determine whether
the foreign state (or economic organization represented by the
foreign antitrust authority) holds any proprietary interest that
could benefit or otherwise be affected by an investigation, a
judicial order, or the provision of such antitrust evidence. 16 2
One final prerequisite must be satisfied before any evidence
can be disclosed to foreign authorities. Namely, the antitrust
mutual assistance agreement that is in effect must meet the
publication requirements of Section 6206 of the IAEAA.' 6 3
Certain classes of information are exempted from the
provisions of the IAEAA under Section 6204, because Congress
deemed such information "too sensitive to be shared." 16 4 One
such class that is absolutely prohibited from being disclosed is
information received under the pre-merger notification provisions

160.

Id. § 6207(a)(3).

161.

Excerpts from H.R. REP. No. 772, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., supra note

119, at 453.
162.
15 U.S.C.A. § 6207(a)(3) (West Supp. 1995). Other factors that aid in a
determination of the public interest of the United States include: (1) whether
notice to a party affected by the disclosure is appropriate, since notice to affected
parties is not mandatory; (2) in a case involving testimony under a grant of
immunity, whether the foreign antitrust authority is prepared to grant immunity
comparable in scope to that granted in the United States; (3) whether the
evidence requested pertains to future business plans or product plans, which are
inherently more sensitive than past business conduct and are generally subject to
stricter scrutiny under antitrust laws. Excerpts from H.R. REP. No. 772, 103d
Cong. 2d Sess., supra note 119, at 454. In considering these public interest
factors, the Attorney General and the FTC may decide to furnish certain evidence
only on conditions further circumscribing its use. Id.
163.
15 U.S.C.A. § 6206 (West Supp. 1995). Section 6206 of the IAEAA
requires that a proposed antitrust mutual assistance agreement be published in
the Federal Register and public comment be requested not less than 45 days
before the agreement is entered into, Id. § 6206(a); that proposed amendments to
an agreement in effect be published in the Federal Register and public comment
be requested not less than 45 days before the amendment Is to be effective, Id. §
6206(b); and that antitrust mutual assistance agreements, amendments, and
terminations be published in the Federal Register no later than 45 days after the
entry date, amendment date, or termination date, Id. § 6206(c).
164.
Excerpts from H.R. REP. No. 772, 103d Cong.. 2d Sess., supra note
119, at 452.
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of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.165
A second class of restricted information is antitrust evidence
presented before a grand jury, the disclosure of which is
prevented by federal law. 1 6 6 Unless a foreign antitrust authority
can show a "particularized need" 16 7 for the grand jury evidence, it
cannot be disclosed. Particularized need is not explicitly defined,
so that courts may exercise some discretion in determining

whether such a need exists. 168 A third class of evidence that is
absolutely prohibited from being disclosed under the IAEAA is
evidence that is authorized to be kept secret for national defense
or foreign policy reasons and that is classified or pending
classification. 16 9
Finally, antitrust evidence that is classified
under section 2162 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 may not be
disclosed. 170
C. Are There Adequate Safeguards to Protect United States
Businesses?
With confidentiality being of such great concern to U.S.
businesses competing internationally, how the IAEAA treats
breaches of confidentiality is an important issue. Like their
foreign counterparts, U.S. antitrust authorities are bound not to
disclose evidence in violation of an antitrust mutual assistance
agreement. 1 7 1 One exception is that the Attorney General or the
FTC shall not withhold evidence from a defendant in an action or

165.
15 U.S.C.A. § 6204(1) (West Supp. 1995). See Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1994). When the IAEAA was
under consideration, the U.S. business community expressed concerns that
improper release of such information could be devastating to the competitive
international positions of United States businesses. This is the reason for the
absolute prohibition. Excerpts from H.R. REP. No. 772, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.,
supra note 119, at 452.
166.
15 U.S.C.A. § 6204(2) (West Supp. 1995).
167. Id. § 6204(2)(A). See generally Illinois v. Abbott & Assoc., 1983-1 Trade
Cas.
65,290, 460 U.S. 557 (1983). For purposes of determining whether a

foreign antitrust authority has a particularized need for grand jury evidence, a
foreign antitrust authority shall be considered an appropriate offlcial of any of the
states and a foreign antitrust law administered or enforced by the foreign
antitrust authority shall be considered a state criminal law.
15 U.S.C.A. §
6204(2(A)-(B) (West Supp. 1995). However, a particularized need of a foreign

government official may be different from that of a state official. Excerpts from
H.R. REP. No. 772, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., supra note 119, at 453.
168. Excerpts from H.R. REP. No. 772, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., supra note
119, at 453.
169.
15 U.S.C.A. § 6204(3) (West Supp. 1995).
170. Id. § 6204(4).
171. Id. § 6207(b).
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proceeding brought by the Attorney General or the FTC if
disclosure would otherwise be required by federal law. 172 If,
however, a foreign antitrust authority improperly discloses
evidence in violation of an antitrust mutual assistance agreement,
the foreign antitrust authority shall notify the Attorney General or
the FTC. 173 The Attorney General or the FTC then must give

notice to the person who provided such evidence. 174 Herein lies a
potential problem of the new legislation.
Sensitive, confidential information can be improperly
disclosed by a foreign authority, and the party that provided the
evidence will only be notified afterwards that the information has
fallen into the hands of potential competitors. The Chairman of
the Competition Committee of the U.S. Council for International
Business voiced concerns that companies do not have to be
notified before information is disclosed by the Attorney General or
the FTC. 175 Congress chose not to mandate notice to affected
parties before disclosure because it envisioned some instances
where notice would not be advisable. 17 6 Whether a company that
may be adversely affected by the disclosure of sensitive
information should be notified of the foreign request and have an
opportunity to express its concerns to the Attorney General or the
FTC before disclosure is another public interest factor to be taken
into account under Section 6207(a)(3). 17 7 For the IAEAA to be
effective, the Attorney General and the FTC must closely
scrutinize the confidentiality procedures of the foreign antitrust
authority before evidence Is provided to insure that instances of
78
improper disclosure are kept to a bare minimum.1

172.

Id.

173.

Id. § 6211(2)(H)(i).

174.

Id. § 6211(2)(H)(ii).

175. House Subcommittee ConsidersBillfor Reciprocal Antitrust Enforcement,
INT'L BUS. & FIN. DAILY (BNA), Aug. 9, 1994, at D2, available in Westlaw, BNA-IBFD

database.
176. Excerpts from H.R. REP. No. 772, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., supra note
119, at 454. For example, if the affected party is a target or subject of a criminal

investigation by the foreign antitrust authority, notice could alert the affected
party to take evasive action.
177. Id. See also supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
178. This is especially pertinent, since the determinations of the Attorney
General and the FTC made before providing evidentiary, investigatory, or
discovery assistance are completely exempt from judicial review. 15 U.S.C.A. §
6208(a) (West Supp. 1995). Due to the subjective and forward-looking nature of

the reciprocity determinations and confidentiality assurances, the House
Committee concluded that they must lie within the considered discretion of the
Attorney General and the FTC. Excerpts from H.R. REP. No. 772, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess., supra note 119, at 454. The House Committee expects the Attorney
General and the FTC to take utmost care in exercising this discretion. Id.
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VI. THE POSSIBILITY OF MULTILATERAL CONSENSUS: A LOOK AT
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PROBLEMS

A. The Feasibilityof Multilateral Solutions
In many ways, it seems correct to assert that the recent
footnote 159 cases and the Supreme Court decision in Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. v. California are "swimming against a rising tide of
cooperation in international antitrust enforcement." 17 9 Although
it may be too early to determine the international implications, if
any, of cases like Pilkington and MCI Communications on
international antitrust enforcement, unilateral solutions to

international problems are inherently limited.18 0 Inevitably, U.S.
courts will treat United States interests as worthy of special
foreign
will
find jurisdiction
over
consideration
and
anticompetitive activity.18 1 Just as inevitably, when domestic
antitrust law is applied extraterritorially, distrust prevails
between the United States and its foreign trading partners. The
United States must worry about retaliatory actions, both in the
form of blocking statutes and in the threat that foreign countries
might sue U.S. businesses for anticompetitive behavior affecting
18 2
them.
Positive comity legislation like the IAEAA addresses the
aforementioned shortcomings. When bilateral mutual assistance
agreements are formed, reciprocity and cooperation become the
proposed solutions to the problem of anticompetitive conduct in
the international economy, not self-imposed restraints and
moderation. A multilateral consensus on international antitrust
183
law and its application extraterritorially is clearly overdue.

179. Alford, supra note 17, at 230.
180.
Chang, supra note 29, at 309. The term "unilateral" refers to the
process of United States courts weighing traditional comity concerns, including
the interests of other nations, as seen in Timberlane and recommended by the
FTAIA and the 1994 International Antitrust Guidelines. See supra Part II of this

Note.
181.

See Chang, supra note 29, at 305. See also Laker Airways Ltd. v.

Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating that

.courts inherently find it difficult neutrally to balance competing foreign interests
land, when] there is any doubt, national interests will tend to be favored over

foreign interests... .).
182. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
183.
See, e.g., Joseph P. Griffin, Possible Resolutions of International
Disputes Over Enforcement of U.S. Antitrust Laws, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 279, 304-07
(1982). Compare Chang, supranote 29. at 309-10.
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Such agreements would, if feasible, be a natural next step away
from the unilateral trend of years past.
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, proposed multilateral
solutions to international antitrust conflicts have met with
discouragingly little success. For example, in 1980, the United
Nations adopted a voluntary antitrust code that created an
antitrust secretariat committee in Geneva.' 8 4 Since then, the
Council of the OECD and the Institute of International Law have

made recommendations concerning extraterritorial jurisdiction
185
and anticompetitive practices affecting international trade.
Most recently, a group of twelve experts known as the
International

Antitrust

Code

Working

Group

proposed

an

International Antitrust Code (Code) to be adopted as a plurilateral
trade agreement under the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT).' s8 The more important provisions of the proposed
Code include: (1) the prohibition of horizontal restraints on trade,
187
which applies to all import, export, and international cartels,
18
8
and (2) the
with a specific emphasis on export cartels;
Authority
(IAA)
of
an
International
Antitrust
establishment
to
Antitrust
Council
consisting of a President and an International
ensure observance of the Code by contracting parties. 18 9 The
proposed Code additionally empowers the IAA to bring actions
against national antitrust authorities before national law courts,
sue private persons who act to restrain competition before
national law courts, and enforce provisions of the Code against
contracting parties.190
The drafters of the Code consider an international antitrust
code as useful internationally as was the development of a United
States federal antitrust code domestically toward the end of the
nineteenth century.' 9 ' It would:
184. See Justice Official Predicts Scant Prospect of International Code, BNA
INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Feb. 8, 1994, at D6, available in Westlaw, BNS-IBFD
database.
185. See Alford, supra note 17, at 230-31 n.78.
186. Int'l Antitrust Code Working Group, Draft International Antitrust Code
as a GATT-MTO-Plurlateral Trade Agreement (July 10, 1993) [hereinafter GATTMTO-Plurilateral Trade Agreement], reprinted in 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1628 (Spec. Supp. 1993).
187. GATT-MTO-Plurilateral Trade Agreement art. 4, § 1.

188. "[Victims of the export cartel may as a practical matter find It
Impossible to get relief by attempts to enforce the law of their own nation because
of Jurisdictional, discovery and enforcement problems. The export cartel problem
is therefore a prime example of why an International antitrust regime Is
necessary, and it Is a prime application of the principle that one may not do to

non-nationals what one is not permitted to do at home." Id. art. 4. § 1 cmt. 2.
189. Id. art. 19, § l(a).
190. Id. art. 19. § 2.
191. Justice Official Predicts Scant Prospect of InternationalCode, supra note
184, at D6.
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1) [Alllow antitrust enforcement to be considered from the interest
of a world citizen, whether that be a consumer or business;
2) avoid the effects of parochial behavior by individual nations
through such means as export cartels; and
costs that spring from different
3) eliminate the high transaction
19 2
rules by different nations.

This particular proposal, if ever adopted, would also represent the
first time that competition policy was explicitly included as part of
a plan to accomplish trade goals,1 9 3 although the Department was
seeking to do the exact same thing when it rescinded footnote 159
and when it brought the Pilklngton and MCI Communications
cases.
B. Multilateral vs. Bilateral Solutions
An international antitrust code is of questionable feasibility.
Plurilateral (or multilateral) trade agreements are limited to an
even greater extent by what could hinder the IAEAA: lack of
ability to bind nations that do not feel it is in their interest to
abide by international antitrust or trade provisions. The more
parties to an agreement, the greater is the potential for national
interests to conflict and prevent consensus on principles of
international antitrust enforcement. "Unless its substantive
principles are made as non-binding suggestions, the Code would
to unacceptable
enforcement
antitrust
national
subject
of hand by key
out
rejected
standardization . . . [and would] be
94
States."'
United
the
as
nations such
This is not to say that international bodies should not
continue actively identifying areas of agreement in the antitrust
the international
in
promoting consensus
realm and
community.' 9 5 But, in a world where many obstacles to free
competition remain, bilateral antitrust assistance agreements like
those mandated under the IAEAA, rather than multilateral
agreements, seem more likely to have an impact on freeing the
196
international marketplace from such competitive restraints.

192. Id.
193. See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The InternationalTrade Laws and the New
Protectionism:The Need for a Synthesis with Antitrust, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM.
REG. 393, 427 (1994).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See Chang, supra note 29, at 309-10 ("ITjhe United States and the
other Pacific countries should initially attempt to enter into bilateral agreements
in order to resolve the current [antitrust] conflict."). Compare Griffin, supra note
183, at 305 ("ITIhe best long-term solutions are multilateral agreements on
antitrust substance and procedure.").
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An effective IAEAA can convince other nations to work
cooperatively to resolve the conflicts posed by the extraterritorial
application of national antitrust law.

VII. CONCLUSION

In sum, the footnote 159 cases are one approach the Justice
Department has taken to solving trade problems that stem from
foreign anticompetitive conduct. In theory, a host of comity
considerations, which include the interests of other nations, are
weighed by the Department before charges are fied. As a
practical matter, if weighed by United States courts, United States
interests will always favor jurisdiction, though in a true footnote
159 case it would be a stretch for the United States to satisfy
domestic jurisdictional standards.
The newly-enacted International Antitrust Enforcement
Assistance Act of 1994 endorses a positive comity approach to
trade problems that stem from foreign anticompetitive conduct,
and, accordingly, contrasts with the footnote 159 approach.
Cooperation and reciprocity are the central legislative themes of

the IAEAA.

The Justice Department nevertheless retains full

discretion to deny foreign requests for antitrust enforcement
assistance when it sees fit. Multilateral proposals have also been
entertained to solve antitrust problems that transcend national
borders.
Whatever method or methods the Justice Department utilizes
as part of its foreign antitrust policy, a number of goals must be
included. First, anticompetitive cartel activity must be eliminated
worldwide. 19 7 Second, the harmonization of national antitrust
laws must be promoted, making the difficult questions of
international enforcement focus not on whether the conduct
should be prosecuted, but rather on what nation is in the best
position to eliminate the anticompetitive activity. Third, the
Department must assist other nations in developing an
international trading community free of informational and
jurisdictional obstacles. These barriers disrupt a nation's ability
to seek redress from a foreign business for conduct foreseen to be
harmful to that nation's economy. From the perspective of the
international community, the International Antitrust Enforcement

197. One commentator notes the irony of lecturing our trading partners on
the evils of cartels in international trade when the United States encourages their
use domestically. United States exporters find export associations (cartels) of little
value, "and any benefits to the United States are outweighed by the restrictive
trade practices they cause or justify in response by our trading partners."
Schoenbaum, supra note 194, at 418-20.
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Assistance Act of 1994 best fulfills these goals through bilateral
mutual assistance agreements. Whether the Justice Department
accepts the perspective of the international community remains to
be seen.
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